

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5283

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 7122/1

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR EG US IS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SADAT ON LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL

REF: CAIRO 7121

1. WHEN I ARRIVED IN CAIRO LATE THIS AFTERNOON, I FOUND A MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED WITH SADAT FOR 2000 LOCAL THIS EVENING. I WAS BARELY ABLE TO GET INTO TOWN, CHANGE AND PICK UP MY POUCH MATERIAL IN TIME FOR THE MEETING. VP MOBAREK AND FAHMY WERE ALREADY THERE WHEN I ARRIVED, AND THE PRESIDENT SUBSEQUENTLY SUMMONED GAMASY. FORTUNATELY, THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL IN CAIRO, SO OUR ONE AND A HALF HOUR LONG MEETING TOOK PLACE AT GIZA. I AM REPORTING THE MEETING IN DETAIL TO GIVE YOU ITS FULL FLAVOR.

2. AFTER PLEASANTERIES, I MADE MY PRESENTATION BASED ON THE TALKING POINTS YOU HAD APPROVED. I RECALLED THAT FOR THE PAST FOUR WEEKS PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU HAVE PRESSED THE ISRAELIS HARD ON COMING UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. SUCH A PROPOSAL, YOU HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED, WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PRESIDENT SADAT'S REQUIREMENTS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND DIRECT EGYPTIAN ACCESS TO THE OIL FIELDS. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD NOT GIVEN OR MENTIONED TO THE ISRAELIS EITHER OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S TWO MAPS AND EXPLAINED WHY WE HAD NOT

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DONE SO. IN CONDUCTING TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER,

YOU HAD BEEN MINDFUL OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S WORD THAT HE WOULD HONOR HIS COMMITMENT MADE TO PRESIDENT FORD AT SALZBURG AND ALSO WHAT HE AGREED UPON AT ASWAN. AS THE PRESIDENT WOULD APPRECIATE, YOUR TASK HAS BEEN IMMENSELY DIFFICULT. FOR DOMESTIC AND STRATEGIC REASONS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE STOUTLY RESISTED. I THEN WENT THROUGH THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTERED IN GETTING THEM TO MOVE OUT OF THE PASSES AND ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACCESS CORRIDOR. REFERRING TO FAHMY'S MESSAGE INDICATING PRESIDENT SADAT'S UNHAPPINESS ABOUT HAVING BEEN KEPT IN THE DARK, I EXPLAINED THAT THE NATURE OF THE INTENSE BARGAINING THAT YOU WERE ENGAGED IN WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THE ALMOST DAILY CHANGES MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO. I HOPED HE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS NO DESIRE TO KEEP HIM UNIFORMED, BUT SIMPLY AN OVERRIDING PURPOSE TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS IN HIS BEHALF.

3. I THEN SHOWED HIM THE LATEST ISRAELI MAP, POINTING OUT THAT IT REPRESENTS DISTINCT PROGRESS OVER WHAT THEY HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED. I NOTED THEIR FORWARD LINE IS JUST ABOUT OUT OF THE PASSES. THE PRESIDENT, I SUGGESTED, SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THIS. IN THE CASE OF MITLA, THEY WOULD GO JUST TO THE EAST OF PARKER'S MEMORIAL. (NONE OF THE EGYPTIANS PRESENT HAD EVER HEARD OF PARKER'S MEMORIAL.) IN THE CASE OF GIDI, IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE LINE CROSSES THE ROAD AT A POINT WHICH IS 350 METERS EAST OF THE LINE DRAWN DIRECTLY SOUTH FROM THE 750 METER POINT ON THE MAP, WHICH THE ISRAELIS DEFINE AS BEING THE EASTERN END OF THE PASS (STATE 170879). GAMASY, WHO SHOWED UP LATER, LOOKED AT THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE AS DRAWN ON THE MAP AND CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD BE JUST ABOUT OUT OF THE PASSES. I THEN SHOWED HIM THE BROADENED ACCESS CORRIDOR WHICH WOULD BE UNDER THE UN WITH EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. IN DOING SO, I POINTED OUT THE CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IT REPRESENTS OVER THE PREVIOUS ISRAELI SUGGESTION. ON THE MATTER OF THE TWO STRETCHES OF ROAD, I SAID WE HAD LOOKED AT THIS CAREFULLY AND WANTED TO INVITE HIS ATTENTION TO A PRACTICAL PROBLEM. THE ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO MOVE THEIR ROAD INLAND IF A PLACE CAN BE FOUND TO DO SO, BUT THE RUGGED TERRAIN

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FEATURES OF THE AREA MAKE IT DOUBTFUL THAT THIS IS FEASIBLE. THEY HAVE OFFERED US A JOINT TECHNICAL COMMISSION TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM. IF EGYPT HAS A SUGGESTION AS TO WHERE SUCH A ROAD MIGHT BE BUILT, WE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS.

I ALSO MENTIONED THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THE ROAD MIGHT BE UNDER THE UN WITH ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS USE IT ON ALTERNATE DAYS. THIS DREW NO RPT NO

SPECIFIC REACTION.

4. ON THE JABAL UMM KHUSHAIB MONITORING STATION, I POINTED OUT THE ISRAELIS AGREE THAT IT MIGHT BE US ADMINISTERED, BUT INSIST THAT THEIR TECHNICIANS WILL HAVE TO OPERATE IT. I ALSO NOTED THAT OUR OWN STUDIES INDICATE THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO OPERATE SUCH A STATION. THE ISRAELIS HAVE AGREED THAT AN EGYPTIAN STATION MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED SOMEWHERE IN THE UN BUFFER ZONE. WE HAVE TOLD ISRAELIS THAT WE WILL PROVIDE EGYPT WITH EQUIPMENT FOR SUCH A STATION IF EGYPT WISHES. I SAID WE HAD IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF TEHERED BALLOONS CARRYING RADAR AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO SUPPLEMENT EGYPTIAN EQUIPMENT. I ALSO MENTIONED THE US-ADMINISTERED MONITORING STATION AT HAMAM FARAUN WHICH THE ISRAELIS WANT. I THEN EXPLAINED THE SIX US MILITARY POSTS SHOWN ON THE MAP. THESE POSTS WOULD MONITOR ACTIVITIES OF BOTH PARTIES AND THUS BE A FURTHER SECURITY ASSET FOR BOTH SIDES. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO GO TO THE CONGRESS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL TO STATION AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AT SUCH POSTS. IF AGREEABLE, I MENTIONED WE WERE THINKING OF 15-20 MEN AT A TIME AT EACH OF THESE POSTS. SUCH PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO BE ROTATED AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WOULD BE NEEDED, MAKING A TOTAL OF SOMEWHERE IN THE 400S.

5. THE ABOVE, I POINTED OUT, IS WHAT THE ISRAELIS PRESENTED LAST THURSDAY. YOU HAD SENT WORD TO RABIN THAT THEY SHOULD DO BETTER. RABIN HAD THEN INDICATED THAT SOME POSSIBLE CHANGES THAT COULD BE MADE, AND I SHOWED THEM THE THREE AREAS SKETCHED ON THE OVERLAY. IN DOING SO, I STRESSED THAT THE EGYPTIANS SHOULD NOT TAKE THESE FOR GRANTED BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT YET BEEN CLEARED BY THE CABINET. IN THE CONTEXT OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, AND
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PROBABLY ONLY TOWARD THE END OF SUCH AN EFFORT, YOU ALSO FELT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADDITIONAL ISRAELI REGRESSION OF THEIR FORWARD LINE IN THE SOUTH AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE AS WELL. IN THE HAMAN FARAUN AREA, YOU BELIEVE ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT TO PUT IT UNDER THE UN WITH NOMINAL EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. YOU ALSO BELIEVE ISRAELI AGREEMENT MIGHT BE OBTAINED FOR SAMS TO BE MOVED FROM PRESENT POSITIONS TO THE CANAL. IN TELLING HIM THIS, I EMPHASIZED IT IS BASED ON A PRIVATE TALK YOU HAD WITH RABIN, BUT IS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT RABIN CAN GET THIS THROUGH THE CABINET. (IN VIEW MY TELECON WITH JOE SISCO PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE AND STATE 170879, I MADE NO RPT NO MENTION OF ANY FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE EGYPTIAN FORWARD LINE; NOR DID I MENTION THE TWO EGYPTIAN COMPANY-SIZED POSTS.)

6. IN CONCLUDING MY PRESENTATION, I CONCEDED THAT THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL IS NOT AS MUCH AS WE HAD HOPED FOR, BUT WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE IT HAS POSITIVE FEATURES. TO TRY TO GO BEYOND IT NOW WOULD REQUIRE A US EFFORT OF A MAGNITUDE SIMILAR TO WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR AN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5284

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 7122/2

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

OVERALL AGREEMENT. IN OUR JUDGMENT, GIVING THE ISRAELIS A US ULTIMATIM WOULD LEAD TO A LONG DOMESTIC CONFRONTATION IN THE US. EVEN IF IT WERE ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD HURT US IN OUR NEXT PHASE OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT.

7. I NOTED THAT THE DECISION AS TO ACCEPTABILITY OF THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL IS ONE WHICH ONLY PRESIDENT SADAT CAN MAKE. IF, IN THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT, IT HAS ENOUGH POSITIVE POINTS TO MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, HE MIGHT WANT TO GIVE US A COUNTERPROPOSAL. IF SO, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ANY EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL BE IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE WILLING TO DO. THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY IF ANY SUCH COUNTERPROPOSAL IS TO BE VIABLE.

8. SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES HEARD ME OUT CAREFULLY AND STUDIED THE MAP INTENTLY. AFTER GAMASY ARRIVED, SADAT ASKED THAT I GO THROUGH THE PROPOSAL AGAIN FOR GAMASY'S BENEFIT, WHICH I DID. FROM HIS REACTION, IT WAS CLEAR

THAT SADAT DID NOT CONSIDER THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL AS VERY GENEROUS. HE LOOKED SOMBER, KEPT SHAKING HIS HEAD AND SPOKE OF THIS OR THAT ASPECT BEING BAD. HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES CONDUCTED SOME VERY SPIRITED DIALOGUE IN ARABIC ON THE SUBJECT OUT OF WHICH SEVERAL OBJECTIONS SURFACED:

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A. FIRST, FAHMY (WHO HAD WITH HIM THE PREVIOUS ISRAELI MAP) IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED THAT THE NEW ISRAELI FORWARD LINE IS FARTHER TO THE WEST THAN THE BLUE LINE OF THE PREVIOUS MAP IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH. THIS, THE EGYPTIANS OPINED, SHOULD NOT BE.

B. SECOND, THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT THEIR TECHNICIANS OPERATE JABAL UMM KHUSHAIB MONITORING STATION, SADAT NOTED, MEANS THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL STILL OCCUPY THE GIDI PASS. GAMASY OBSERVED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO THE STATION IS THROUGH THE GIDI ROAD OR BY COMING AROUND THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE JABAL UMM KHUSHAIB SPUR. SADAT KEPT INSISTING THE US SHOULD OPERATE THE INSTALLATION, AND I KEPT REPEATING THAT WE LACK THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO DO SO. I STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE STATION WOULD BE US-ADMINISTERED. MOBAREK PROPOSED THAT THE STATION BE MOVED TO THE EAST. I EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS WAS NOT PRACTICAL AT THE PRESENT TIME.

C. THIRD, THE PROPOSED US MILITARY POSTS UPSET HIM. THEY SERVED NO PRACTICAL PURPOSES, HE CONTENDED, IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO OPERATE THE JAMAL UMM KHUSHAIB MONITORING STATION. MOREOVER, HAVING THROWN OUT ALL SOVIET TECHNICAL PERSONNEL, IT WOULD GIVE HIM GREAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB WORLD NOW TO AGREE TO HAVE AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SUCH POSTS. IN ADDITION, THE ARAB WORLD WOULD VIEW THESE AMERICAN POSTS AS BENEFITTING ISRAEL RATHER THAN EGYPT. I POINTED OUT SUCH POSTS WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES, BUT SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD NOT BUY THIS.

D. FOURTH, THE TWO ROADS CONTINUE TO BOTHER HIM. HOWEVER, HE ALSO RECOGNIZED THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM INVOLVED AND ASKED GAMASY AND/OR MOBAREK IF THEY KNEW WHETHER A SIMILAR ROAD COULD BE BUILT SOMEWHAT INLAND. GAMASY SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WHEN TRYING TO SHOW AN ALTERNATE LOCATION ON THE MAP, HE MOVED PRETTY FAR INLAND. I CAUTIONED HIM THAT ANY PARALLEL ROAD SHOULD NOT BE VERY FAR INLAND IF IT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE. IN ANY CASE, GAMASY SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS.

E. FIFTH, FAHMY ASKED WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE EGYPTIAN COMPANY-SIZED POSTS NEAR THE WESTERN END OF THE PASSES. I HAD TO TELL HIM THESE HAD BEEN DROPPED BECAUSE

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OF THE EXTENT OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN THE PASS AREA.
BOTH SADAT AND FAHMY SEEMED TO ATTACH SOME IMPORTANCE TO
SUCH EGYPTIAN COMPANY-SIZED POSTS.

9. AFTER WE HAD GONE OVER VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE
ABOVE MATTERS SEVERAL TIMES, SADAT FINALLY SAID HE AND HIS
ASSOCIATES WILL WANT TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL. I AGAIN
NOTED THAT, IF THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THE LATEST PROPOSAL
HAS ENOUGH POSITIVE ASPECTS TO BE ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE,
AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL INDICATING AREAS WHERE THEY
BELIEVE CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE WILL HELP TO KEEP THE BALL IN PLAY.
WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT'S DISAPPOINTMENT, I THOUGHT
HE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE PROPOSAL'S POSITIVE POINTS.
YOU HAD EXPERIENCED A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT TO GET FOR THE
PRESIDENT WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD TO BE HIS PRINCIPAL REQUIRE-
MENTS, E.G. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND
ACCESS CORRIDOR TO THE OILFIELDS. THESE, THE LATEST
ISRAELI PROPOSAL OFFERED. SADAT NODDED IN ASSENT.

10. ALLUDING TO MY COMMENT THAT SOME THINGS MIGHT
BE GAINED ONCE A NEW SHUTTLE EFFORT GETS UNDERWAY,
SADAT AND FAHMY ASKED WHEN YOU WOULD EXPECT TO ENGAGE
YOURSELF IN SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY. I SAID IT DEPENDED
UPON WHEN BOTH PARTIES ARE READY FOR YOU TO DO SO
AND REMINDED THEN THAT YOU DO NOT INTEND TO ENGAGE
YOURSELF IN SUCH AN EFFORT AGAIN UNTIL THERE IS
REASONABLE ASSURANCE FROM BOTH SIDES THAT A DEAL CAN BE
WORKED OUT. I RECALLED THAT YOU HAD SPOKEN INFORMALLY RPT
INFORMALLY OF AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AUGUST
SHUTTLE OPERATION SEEMED TO PLEASE THE PRESIDENT. HE ASKED
IF THE "OTHER SIDE" HAS AGREED TO AN AUGUST DATE. I SAID I
SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW AND THAT I DOUBTED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN
DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL, SINCE NO ONE COULD SAY
WHETHER THE PRESENT ISRAELI PROPOSAL WAS LIKELY TO BE
ACCEPTABLE.

11. SADAT THEN SAID HE WILL WANT TO TALK WITH ME AGAIN TOMORROW
EVENING. BEFORE LEAVING, I ASKED IF I COULD INFORM YOU
THAT HE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE AND THAT AN
EGYPTIAN COUNTER PROPOSAL WILL BE OFFERED. THE PRESIDENT
RESPONDED THAT I SHOULD INFORM YOU THAT, WHILE HE DOES NOT LIKE
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MANY ELEMENTS OF
THE PRESENT PROPOSAL, HE DOES NOT REJECT IT AS HE HAD THE PREVIOUS

ONE. AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL WILL DEFINITELY BE FORTHCOMING. I AGAIN URGED THAT ANY SUCH COUNTER-PROPOSAL BE IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL IF THERE IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF NEGOTIATING SOMETHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. SADAT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT.

12. COMMENT: I SUSPECT THAT THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL WILL AT A MINIMUM TRY TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 8 ABOVE, WHICH CLEARLY TROUBLE SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES. ALTHOUGH I HAVE CAUTIONED EGYPTIANS TO KEEP IT IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL AND THEY PROFESS TO UNDERSTAND THIS, WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRIZED IF THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL STRAYS PRETTY FAR FROM THE FRAMEWORK WE WOULD LIKE.

13. FAHMY TELEPHONE JUST A FEW MINUTES AGO (2245 LOCAL) TO LET ME KNOW THAT A SECOND MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR ME AT 2000 TOMORROW, JULY 21, AT WHICH TIME I WILL BE GIVEN AN EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL WITH MAP. HE ASKED THAT I GET IT TO YOU RIGHT AWAY. I WILL TELEGRAPH ESSENTIALS AND SEND MAP WITH SY OFFICER WALTER SARGENT, WHO ACCOMPANIED ME TO CAIRO. HE WILL PLAN TO LEAVE ON TUESDAY'S TWA FLIGHT AND ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON LATER SAME DAY.
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